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Chapter 8 – Pressure Politics and the ‘Scottish Policy Style’  
Chapter 5 suggests that the Scottish Parliament did not foster new and effective forms of 
deliberative and participatory democracy.  It highlights the similarities between the 
Westminster and Holyrood systems and argues that, in both, most policy is formulated 
outside the legislative arena following regular consultation between governments and 
pressure participants such as interest groups.  This chapter examines the extent to which 
that process of policymaking is distinctive in Scotland following devolution.  In other words, 
is there a ‘Scottish Policy Style’?  Policy style refers simply to the ways in which 
governments make and implement policy (Richardson, 1982).  It has two dimensions: the 
way that governments make policy, in consultation with pressure participants; and, the way 
that they implement policy in partnership with organizations such as local authorities (chapter 
7).   
Pressure participants - bodies attempting to influence public policy. They can be trades 
unions or membership groups such as Greenpeace, but the organizations most likely to lobby 
governments are businesses, public sector bodies and other types of government (Jordan et al, 
2004). 
We can identify some hopes for ‘new politics’ in this area, linked to the idea that Scotland is 
a ‘consensus’ rather than a ‘majoritarian’ democracy (box 8.2).  The SCC proposed, albeit in 
a rather vague way, a new type of pluralist democracy in which consultation with affected 
interests would be as wide as possible, not only with established interest groups but also 
previously excluded groups with a limited voice and ability to organise.   This push for 
broader consultation is associated with a monitoring role performed by Scottish Parliament 
committees who may oblige the Scottish Government to consult far and wide until they are 
satisfied that all groups have ‘had their say’. This would perhaps help produce a new and 
improved consultation process between the Scottish Government, Scottish Parliament and a 
wide range of representative organizations in the community, voluntary sector, professions 
and business. This inclusion of hitherto excluded sections of society would come at some 
expense to the ‘usual suspects’, or the larger and better resourced groups which tend to 
dominate consultation time with government. 
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The tone of much of these recommendations is based on the idea that new forms of 
consultation would take Scotland further away from UK policymaking which is relatively 
‘top-down’ and based either on a lack of proper consultation or consultation restricted to a 
small number of powerful groups that squeeze out the competition.  Yet, much of the 
policymaking literature suggests that this image of the UK is a caricature based on minimal 
evidence.  Scotland may have its own policy style, but this is often related to factors unrelated 
to ‘new politics’ (such as Scotland’s size and the scale of its responsibilities).  The 
recommendations are also perhaps based on the assumption that there can be a Scottish-
specific arena in which pressure participants can engage.  Rather, organised groups must 
consider how best to influence policy in an era of ‘multi-level governance’ in which many 
levels and types of government are involved, from the European Union (chapter 10) to local 
authorities.   Further, the role of local authorities has changed since 2007, prompting many 
groups to reassess their lobbying strategies. 
This chapter discusses: 
 The meaning of ‘pluralist democracy’ and the SCC hopes for a new Scottish Policy 
Style. 
 The nature of pressure politics in Scotland.  
 The evidence of a difference between Scottish and UK policy styles. 
 The strategies of interest groups in Scotland who are faced with uncertainty in the era 
of multi-level governance.   
 The impact of SNP Government since 2007. 
 
Pluralist Democracy in Scotland  
One problem with representative democracy is that it is relatively easy to address the 
‘democratic deficit’ by reforming political and geographical boundaries (shifting popular 
representation from the UK to Scotland), but difficult to address disenchantment with 
traditional forms of popular participation.  We are still faced with low electoral turnouts 
(indeed, fewer people vote in Scottish Parliament elections than UK General) and a voting 
population with often limited knowledge of the policies of parties and candidates. One 
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alternative form of participation for individuals is through organisations such as interest 
groups (Jordan and Stevenson, 2000).  Indeed, the relationship between pressure participants 
and governments is at the heart of explanations for government policy - most policy is made 
in policy ‘networks’ or ‘communities’ (box 8.1).  
 
Box 8.1 The Pervasiveness of Policy Networks or Communities  
The size and scope of any state is so large that its responsibilities are potentially 
unmanageable. Consequently, its component parts are broken down into policy sectors and 
sub-sectors, with power spread across government and shared with pressure participants. 
Ministers and senior civil servants devolve the bulk of decision making to less senior officials 
who consult with organised groups and exchange access for resources such as expertise. This 
exchange encourages group ‘ownership’ of policy and maximizes governmental knowledge 
of possible problems. ‘Policy community’ or ‘network’ describes this relationship between 
civil servants and certain groups.  A (perhaps vague or intangible) sense of ‘membership’ of 
that community is often based on the willingness of its members to follow and enforce the 
same ‘rules of the game’. When civil servants and groups form relationships, they recognize 
the benefits – such as institutional stability and policy continuity – of attempting to insulate 
their decisions from the wider political process. For example, inclusion within the community 
might depend on the gaining of personal trust or group-government relationships might 
become based on a ‘common culture’ in which there is strong agreement on the nature of, and 
solutions to, policy problems.  If accurate, this image of policymaking suggests that 
communities are often difficult to access; that there are significant barriers to entry to the 
policymaking process.  People can easily participate in pressure politics but find it more 
difficult to influence decisions (see Cairney, 2012a: 89-90).   
 
The SCC envisaged a new role for interest groups engaging directly with the Scottish 
Government and Scottish Parliament. Perhaps in recognition of the barriers to policy 
influence described in box 8.1, it rejects the idea that this consultation will take place with the 
‘usual suspects’, or the biggest and most resourced interest groups who already have close 
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ties to government. This push for broader consultation is associated with an unusual formal 
monitoring role (introduced by the SCG) performed by Scottish Parliament committees who 
may oblige the Scottish Government to consult far and wide until they are satisfied that all 
groups have ‘had their say’ on draft legislation (a power used very rarely, which suggests that 
the Scottish Government tends to consult well enough).  In other words, we can identify 
hopes for an improved pluralist democracy, with widespread consultation between the 
Scottish Government and a broader range of groups, with less time spent talking to the ‘usual 
suspects’ and more with previously excluded groups. Access for groups would be more 
frequent and of a better quality than in the past; the consultation process would be more open, 
perhaps with a clearer link between group effort and the end result.  As described, these aims 
are reminiscent of Lijphart’s (1999) famous description of consensus democracies, marking 
deliberate movement away from the idea of ‘majoritarian’ democracy (box 8.2). 
 
Box 8.2 Majoritarian and Consensus Democracies  
Lijphart (1999) presents a simple distinction between ‘majoritarian’ and ‘consensus’ 
democracies according to their formal institutional make-up (a comprehensive table outlining 
their differences can be found in Cairney, 2012a: 89).  Lijphart’s (1999: 2) argument is that 
there are two basic models of electoral and political system design: those that concentrate 
power in the hands of the few (majoritarian) and those that ‘share, disperse, and limit power’ 
(consensus).  In a majoritarian democracy the first-past-the-post voting system exaggerates 
governing majorities by (in most cases) granting a majority of seats in the legislature to a 
party which commands only a plurality of the vote.  This result in the UK, combined with an 
imbalance of power towards the governing party’s leadership, a weak second chamber and a 
unitary government, generally produces a concentration of power at the centre.  Lijphart 
(1999: 2-3) associates majoritarian democracies with an ‘exclusive, competitive and 
adversarial’ mentality in which parties compete within parliament, interest groups are more 
likely to compete with each other than cooperate, and governments are more likely to impose 
policy from the top down than seek consensus.  In effect, this is a description of the 
‘Westminster model’ so familiar to students of UK and Scottish politics (box 2.1).   In a 
‘consensus’ democracy, the proportional electoral system generally produces no overall 
majority and power is dispersed across parties, encouraging the formation of coalitions based 
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on common aims. This spirit of ‘inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise’ extends to 
group-government relations, with groups more likely to cooperate with each other and 
governments more willing to form corporatist alliances).   
 
Using Lijphart’s measures, Flinders (2010) identifies profoundly different political systems in 
the UK and Scotland.  ‘Bi-constitutionalism’ suggests that, while the UK remains 
majoritarian, the devolved Scottish arena became like a consensus democracy in the Lijphart 
mould, with a proportional electoral system providing a new context conducive to power 
sharing among parties, between government and Parliament, and between the government 
and interest groups (2010: 173-7). This interpretation, and method of calculation, is critiqued 
by Jordan and Cairney (2013). 
    
Yet, this simple binary distinction between the ‘majoritarian’ UK and ‘consensus’ Scottish 
democracy is just as problematic as the description of ‘old Westminster’ and ‘new Scottish 
Parliament’ that we describe in chapter 1.  It is based on a caricature of UK politics that is 
often assumed rather than demonstrated.   For example, it assumes (wrongly) that the barriers 
to consultation are relatively high in the UK.  These points should be borne in mind when we 
consider the ‘Scottish Policy Style’.  The evidence may suggest that group-government 
relations in Scotland are generally consensual, but does it also suggest that such relations 
differ from other countries such as the UK? 
Pressure Politics in Scotland: the development of ‘territorial policy communities’ 
What we can say with more certainty is that devolution has changed the ways in which 
groups and governments interact in Scotland. Keating et al (2009: 54) suggest that devolved 
policymaking arrangements are particularly significant in Scotland, compared to Wales and 
Northern Ireland, because the Scottish Parliament was granted the most powers within the 
UK political system.  Their main suggestion is that, in Scotland, we should expect: 
1. Relatively high levels of interest group devolution, or the proliferation of new 
Scottish groups, as groups feel increasingly obliged to lobby Scottish political 
institutions. 
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2. ‘Cognitive change’, in which policy problems are defined from a Scottish territorial 
perspective and groups follow, and seek to influence, a devolved policy agenda. 
3. In some cases, very close relationships between groups and government.  The 
relationships might resemble ‘corporatism’ (in which representatives of business, 
trades unions and government from close relationships which are ‘institutionalised’ 
within government policymaking structures), although the Scottish Government does 
not have the economic policy levers associated with such relationships.  
4. A new group-government dynamic, in which groups might either coalesce around a 
common lobbying strategy, or find that they are now competitors in their new 
environment. 
5. A series of ‘historic legacies’ based on how groups initially viewed devolution.  For 
example, groups opposed to devolution may have been slower to adapt and devote 
resources to lobbying new Scottish institutions. 
While many UK groups had regional arms, and many Scottish-specific groups existed before 
devolution (partly reflecting the value of lobbying the old Scottish Office), there has been a 
significant shift of group attention to reflect the new devolved arrangements.  In particular, 
UK groups have devolved further resources to their Scottish offices to reflect the devolution 
of power and their new lobbying demands (50% of groups lobbying in Scotland fall into this 
category – Keating, 2005a: 65).  We should not over-estimate this shift, since organisational 
devolution has varied (often according to the level of devolution in their areas – e.g. trade 
union devolution is often limited, reflecting the reservation of employment law) and some 
groups have provided few additional resources (such as one additional member of staff).   
Perhaps more importantly, groups increasingly follow a devolved policy agenda.  This shift 
of focus varies, from Scottish compulsory education (and, to a lesser extent, health) policy 
which has always been distinct in Scotland and most relevant organisations existed long 
before devolution in 1999 (Cairney, 2013a), to examples such as ‘free personal care’ in which 
the Scottish Government was preparing to make its own decision, and areas such as economic 
development in which there is still a limited, but important, Scottish Government role.  They 
also face a new organisational task.  The pre-1999 process often involved the Scottish Office 
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deciding how to implement a version of UK Government policy, perhaps joining with a 
coalition of groups to attempt to influence UK policy formulation.  It was replaced by the 
need for the Scottish Government to come up with its own policies and, consequently, for 
pressure participants to answer Scottish Government calls for policy ideas.  This may also 
come with a new dynamic: the same groups, formerly joined together in (for example) a 
united lobby against UK policies, now find that they have to compete with each other, or at 
least have more of a chance to express different views.    
The evidence suggests that some groups addressed the need to change more quickly than 
others.  Most notably, business groups opposed to devolution (and linked in the minds of 
many to Conservative party rule up to 1997) were relatively slow to adapt, while the 
voluntary sector quickly established links that it began to develop with the Labour party in 
government from 1997 (Keating et al, 2009: 55).    Perhaps ironically (since education was 
relatively devolved), some teacher unions took time to adapt to their new arrangements after 
significant spells in which they enjoyed very poor relationships with civil servants in the 
Scottish Office (Cairney, 2013a).   
Interest groups and participation: the evidence 
How do we assess the evidence on group-government relations and relate it to the fulfilment 
of SCC aims? The most direct way is to talk to a wide range of organisations such as interest 
groups and ask them to assess their experiences since devolution (and, if possible, to compare 
them with pre-1999 consultations). Box 8.3 reports the key findings of research conducted 
within the first two years of devolution. 
 
Box 8.3 Interest groups: the post-devolution experience 
 Devolution caused a profound shift of group focus, with many Scottish groups increasing 
their policy capacity and UK groups increasing the resource of their Scottish arms. 
 Groups have a positive image of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government and 
choose to ‘hedge their bets’ and influence both. 
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 Both the Scottish Parliament (MSPs and committees) and the Scottish Government 
(ministers and civil servants) are much easier to access, with fewer resources required by 
groups to engage and a greater willingness of decision-makers to consult. 
 Groups enjoy regular dialogue with MSPs and civil servants. 
 The terms of engagement have changed, from the lobbying and complaining which 
characterized engagement with the Scottish Office, to substantive debate and 
engagement on policy issues with the Scottish Government. 
 Networks have also developed between groups with similar interests - such as the ‘gang 
of 5’ business groups (including the CBI and Chambers of Commerce) - and more 
common ground has been found between a range of economic and social groups around 
Scottish Government themes such as social inclusion. 
Source:  Keating and Stevenson (2001); Keating (2005; 2009); Keating et al (2009). 
 
It suggests that the experience of interest groups is broadly (although not completely) in 
line with the hopes associated with new politics. Groups are generally positive about 
devolution, feel engaged and listened to, and benefit from their proximity to decision-makers. 
Therefore, devolution has marked a profound and enduring shift in the fortunes of interest 
groups trying to influence Scottish policy (similar conclusions are also reported by groups in 
Wales). Interest groups report better relations than they experienced before devolution, and 
most suggest that their lobbying experiences are superior to those enjoyed at the UK 
Government level. 
However, we need to bear in mind the difference between group perceptions of their 
lobbying experiences and their knowledge regarding why they are in this new position and 
how it compares to equivalent processes related to the UK Government.  Consequently, there 
are several arguments which may qualify this rosy picture, divided into a consideration of 
group perceptions and Scottish-specific conditions.  
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The first point on group perceptions (made by Grant Jordan and discussed to some extent 
in Jordan and Stevenson, 2000) is that, since many of the groups interviewed were associated 
with the devolution movement, they would be very unlikely to report that devolution did not 
make a difference (in other words, ‘they would say that, wouldn’t they?’).  Second, 
comparisons are often based on a skewed idea of group-government relations in the UK 
(Jordan and Stevenson, 2000; Jordan and Cairney, 2013). The barriers to entry to the UK 
government consultation process have always been low (and, since 1999, we have seen that 
process become easier following the use of information technology to manage consultations). 
Consultation lists are large and groups are generally included if they ask. The process on this 
scale therefore becomes ‘cosmetic’; a ‘trawling exercise’ with low-level civil-service 
involvement (Grant, 2000). Maloney et al. (1994: 32) distinguished between ‘peripheral 
insider’ groups (engaged but not influential in the process) with core or specialist insiders 
who enjoy more frequent and fruitful contact with government.  
This is relevant to Scotland where groups report better access but, ‘claim that it is still 
too early to tell whether the consultation process offers them any real influence’ (Keating and 
Stevenson, 2001). In more recent interviews, respondents are still reticent on the link between 
access and influence, suggesting that it is ‘easy to speak to the civil service but not to change 
things’. Often, groups will also report the higher likelihood that civil servants will act as 
gatekeepers to ministers, particularly if the issue is no longer on the Scottish Government’s 
agenda. 
Third, interest-group devolution may explain why Scottish groups are so enthusiastic 
about relationships with government. They are comparing their influence now with their lack 
of influence before devolution (as relatively neglected regional offices), rather than the 
influence their UK counterparts enjoyed. Similarly, independent groups are comparing their 
access as Scottish groups in devolved territories with their previous UK experience of 
competition with groups who had more resources and better access to UK decision-makers. 
Devolution may therefore be as much about reducing competition as opening channels of 
access. Or, groups may find that an issue that was crowded out by other agendas in the UK 
may receive greater prominence in Scotland.  
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These three points were perhaps most relevant in the early years of devolution, 
particularly for interviewees with longer memories.  Many of the most vocal supporters of 
devolution were from interests that had poor contacts with successive UK Conservative 
Governments and pursued agendas not favoured by the Conservatives. The calls for ‘new 
politics’ were perhaps sparked by this specific political tension rather than a more general 
‘majoritarian’ or top-down style. The idea that the UK government failed to engage with 
groups perhaps gives way to the idea that it paid relatively little attention to ‘fringe’ interests 
representing agendas different from the majority party.  Groups are perhaps now more able to 
reflect on their experiences over the longer term. 
Fourth, it is the size of the interest-group population in England which exaggerates the 
appearance of ‘top-down’ policy-making which excludes many groups. There are fewer 
‘winners’ and more ‘losers’ to highlight their exclusion or lack of influence. In Scotland, 
while groups may feel more included there is still a process of winning and losing. Although 
devolution presents a new opportunity to engage with government, many groups may not 
have the capacity to exploit it. Much depends on the status of groups before devolution, with 
independent groups reporting fewer problems compared to devolved arms of UK organiza-
tions with insufficient organizational devolution. Some may have one member of staff with 
no research capacity. So, for example, the biggest winner is often local government (and its 
associated professional groups) which is relatively well-resourced and a crucial player in the 
implementation of policy. Or, there are dominant groups within particular policy areas, such 
as the Educational Institute for Scotland or the British Medical Association (Box 8.4). 
Fifth, interviews with a large number of groups will throw up a range of perceptions and 
responses to the same questions. In particular, many groups report fluctuating fortunes 
according to the agenda of the Scottish Government at any particular time. For example, 
many business groups were initially opposed to devolution and it took them some time to 
develop a meaningful relationship with the Scottish Government. This was particularly the 
case for groups representing landowners and seen as the ‘old guard’ with close links to 
previous Conservative Governments.  In contrast, social groups and trade unions already had 
a good relationship with government following the election of Labour in 1997. These groups 
were supportive of devolution and were able to build on relationships immediately. There 
was also a strong social policy agenda immediately following devolution. This meant that 
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social and voluntary groups were more likely to seek and gain access. Then, from 2003-07, 
there was a significant shift of focus to the importance of the economy, perhaps at the 
expense of social issues. Labour’s punitive focus on crime also had the potential to 
undermine, or at least detract attention from, the initial focus on social inclusion (for 
example, homelessness groups worried that the focus on anti-social behaviour undermined 
the security of housing tenancies). As a result, business groups felt more influential in this 
second term and some social groups felt marginalized following the shift. There were some 
expectations that the election of an SNP Government might interrupt established group-
government relationships – perhaps, for example, having a great effect on the Scottish 
Government’s relationship with trades unions.  However, arguably the biggest effect has been 
on its relationship with local authorities (discussed below) as well as particular bodies 
following particular decisions (such as to regulate alcohol – box 8.5). 
The first point to note on Scottish-specific conditions is that we can reasonably expect a 
degree of similarity in Scottish and UK processes.  In particular, there is the same logic to 
regular consultation with the ‘usual suspects’. These groups have resources valuable to 
government – such as the expertise necessary to give good advice and the ability to represent 
a large group of people with often-similar views (the latter is often associated with 
‘professional’ groups of, for example, teachers, doctors and nurses). In Scotland there is a 
growing acknowledgement by groups and government on this point. After an initial flurry of 
activity, groups have become more selective in their approach to consultation responses, 
while governments are increasingly aware of the greater need to consult those most affected 
by, and involved in, the implementation of policy. A good example of this process is when 
some groups talk about pre-consultation, or even in some cases what might be clumsily called 
pre-pre-consultation! In other words, some groups are contacted before the consultation goes 
out to the general public. Others are asked to form working groups to advise the Scottish 
Government on what the consultation should look like. Therefore the consultation may 
eventually be wide but, by the time the questions are asked of the public, the debate has been 
‘framed’ in a particular way based on answers that have already been provided. 
Second, we are rarely comparing like-with-like when we study the top level of 
government in each country. In Scotland, the interest-group population is relatively small, 
allowing senior ministers and civil servants the ability to manage policy communities 
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personally.  In other words, it is often possible in Scotland to have a meeting with all the 
major players in one small seminar room (in England it would require a lecture theatre). In 
England, the terrain is vast and the scope of government is divided into more manageable 
sub-sectors at lower levels of government (or government agencies). It is at this lower level 
of government that UK-focused groups are more likely to express satisfaction with their 
participation. 
Third, these new consultation arrangements may be borne out of necessity as well as 
choice; as a reflection of policymaking constraints as well as a new culture. The Scottish 
Government suffers from a relative lack of policy capacity in comparison to the UK 
Government (in other words, it has far fewer, trained and experienced, civil servants available 
to research, consult on and make policy). The legacy of the Scottish Office is a civil service 
engaged in policy implementation rather than policy formulation. It lacked capacity following 
devolution and relied heavily on outside interests for information and advice. As Keating 
(2005a: 106) suggests, this factor combined with a smaller political arena (with closer 
personal contacts and easier coordination) explains high levels of participation and the 
‘Scottish Policy Style’.   
A final point is that the first eight years of devolution went hand in hand with significant 
increases in UK and Scottish public expenditure.   The main effect was that there were 
comparatively few major policy disagreements in Scotland.  Departments or groups were 
competing with each other for resources, but that competition was not fierce because most 
policy programmes appeared to be relatively well funded.  In fact, the Scottish Government 
did not spend its entire budget from 1999-2007 (instead, it maintained a surplus or ‘end year 
flexibility’ - chapter 11).  Now, in the austerity era, in which Scottish Government budgets 
are falling, there is more potential for strained relationships between government and groups, 
and competition between different groups or interests, when tougher policy choices have to 
be made.  Time will tell if the first ‘honeymoon’ decade of Scottish group-government 
relations reflected a particularly Scottish culture of cooperation and the pursuit of consensus  
or the once favourable economic climate (Cairney, 2011a: 80).   
 
Box 8.4 Pluralism and the usual suspects 
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Most groups may report better links with the Scottish Government, but the ‘usual suspects’ 
may still be consulted most. We can see this in a range of policy areas. In compulsory 
education, there is less union competition than we find in England. The Educational Institute 
for Scotland is by far the biggest union with 58,000 members (its closest ‘rival’, the Scottish 
Secondary Teachers’ Association has 8,000) and head-teacher organizations often do not 
have the status enjoyed in England. This means that the EIS dominates professional 
representation in pay negotiations since ‘seats at the table’ are allocated by size.  In health, 
the British Medical Association and Royal College of Nursing are consulted routinely, while 
the remainder of the health profession may struggle for systematic inclusion (via the Allied 
Health Professions group which is not well funded). In issues relating to local government, 
although individual professions are represented, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
(COSLA) is by far the most consulted. The Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(SCVO) has a prominent place as a key (but not sole) representative of the ‘third’ or 
voluntary sector.  In issues related to business, the ‘big 5’ (Confederation of British Industry, 
Institute of Directors, Chambers of Commerce, Scottish Financial Enterprise, Scottish 
Council for Development and Industry) formed a group which often excluded the Federation 
of Small Businesses. In issues related to the environment, Friends of the Earth is realistic 
about its influence when environmental policy competes with agriculture. Further, since the 
drafting of legislation requires expertise, the Law Society of Scotland and Faculty of 
Advocates are called upon more than most.  Yet, it is still appropriate to describe the Scottish 
system as pluralistic: (a) because no group dominates one policy area to the exclusion of all 
others; and (b) this large range of elites competing for governmental attention and public 
policy resources ensures that no group dominates the policy-process as a whole. The picture 
also changes with, for example, the EIS now less powerful following the devolution of much 
education policymaking to local authorities.  Of course, this discussion suggests that 
‘pluralism’ is not synonymous with equality of access and power. Rather, it is ‘elitism’s close 
cousin’ (Moran, 2005: 16). 
 
How do interest groups deal with multi-level governance? 
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Chapter 10 identifies the importance of multi-level governance, which partly involves the 
spread of policymaking responsibility to many levels (including the EU, UK, Scottish 
Government, and local authorities) and types of government (such as central, local, agencies 
and quangos).  One consequence of this complicated picture is that pressure participants often 
adopt rather sophisticated strategies to make sure that they are lobbying the right people at 
the right times.  This may be easier for some than others, since lobbying takes time and 
resources that not all groups possess.   
There are three main points to note. First, not surprisingly, groups are more willing to seek 
access to Scottish institutions when they appear to be central to, or have a significant 
influence on, particular policies. Second, the strategy of groups varies according to their own 
resources and organizational structure. In other words, small groups with few resources to 
lobby tend to focus their attention on the Scottish Government as a route into the UK and EU 
(and even local authority) arenas. Similarly, Scottish arms of UK organizations often filter 
their views up to the UK centre, with direct governmental contact often restricted to the 
Scottish Government as a supplement to the main event (since Scottish arms of groups rarely 
develop their own positions on EU and UK policy). Third, there is significant variation by 
policy area (see Keating, 2005a; 2010; Keating and Stevenson, 2001). Therefore, as a whole, 
we see distinct policy areas with varying group strategies within them. A number of examples 
should demonstrate this point. 
Policy areas more reserved than devolved 
Since most economic policy areas are reserved, the big banks based in Scotland tend to focus 
their efforts towards the UK and wider international fields, either individually or as part of 
the British Bankers’ Association.  This is a process complicated by the economic crisis and 
the failure of many major banks, but the experience suggests that the main point of contact 
remained the UK, not Scottish, Government (and the UK Government is now the majority 
shareholder of the Royal Bank of Scotland). Scottish banks are also part of Scottish Financial 
Enterprise which seeks to promote a positive image of the financial sector through issues 
such as education and training and social inclusion (again, an aim that was undermined 
severely by the economic crisis and the role and plight of many of the major banks).  
219 
The whisky trade (which may be based in Scotland but is increasingly owned elsewhere) 
traditionally focused almost all of its efforts at the UK and EU levels, with issues of duty and 
general taxation at the forefront of their concerns. This focus changed somewhat after 2007 
when the Scottish Government announced plans to introduce a minimum price on a unit of 
alcohol (and the SWA became the main representative of the alcohol industry seeking to 
oppose the measures - box 8.5).   
The Scottish arms of business groups such as the Confederation of British Industry, 
Institute of Directors and Federation of Small Business in Scotland lobby in the Scottish 
arena (business rates, tourism, training, transport) while maintaining links with their UK 
organizations which take the lead on UK and European issues.  They are also often key 
players in the debate on constitutional change, partly because the idea of business confidence 
and uncertainty is often used by opponents of independence to try to close down the debate 
(chapter 12).   
Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC): An umbrella body to articulate the views of 
trades unions in Scotland. 
The reserved nature of employment law and the minimum wage may explain why it has 
taken a long time for UK unions to devolve significant resources to their Scottish branches. 
The biggest exception is the large public-sector trade union UNISON which largely 
represents a range of NHS staff. The Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) (a separate 
organization from the TUC), enjoyed close links with the Scottish Labour Party and signed a 
concordat in 2004 with the Scottish Government to make sure that access to the civil servants 
would be similar to access to ministers even following a change of party in government. It 
discusses devolved matters - such as economic development, public services, ‘social 
partnership’ and lifelong learning - with blurred issues such as the health and safety of public 
sector workers more difficult to resolve. 
Policy areas which are devolved but Europeanized 
Since agriculture policy is Europeanized, Scottish groups must maintain links with the UK 
government to access the EU formally. The National Farmers Union Scotland (NFUS) uses 
the Scottish Government as a first point of formal contact while maintaining day-to-day links 
220 
with the NFU England (which is a separate organization) and broad European networks. The 
reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has increased the scope for territorial 
differences in implementation, but most of the consultation documents issued by the Scottish 
Government relate to EU or UK agendas. The NFUS supplements these links with informal 
EU contact through a Brussels office it shares with the NFU. 
Environmental policy has, since 1999, shared a government department with agriculture 
(although the Scottish Government is increasingly blurring boundaries between formal 
departments – see chapter 6). Therefore, while Friends of the Earth (FOE) Scotland (a 
separate organization from the rest of the UK) focuses most of its efforts in Scotland, it is 
realistic about its relative success given the size of the agricultural budget compared to 
environmental spending. While there are some relevant reserved issues (such as company 
law) it spends the remainder of its time linking with FOE Europe. The number of Scottish 
Government consultation documents arising from EU or UK agendas is similarly high. 
Relatively devolved areas 
Compulsory education policy is possibly the best example of focused group activity at a 
devolved level. Teaching unions such as the Educational Institute of Scotland (EIS) focus 
primarily on lobbying the Scottish Government and negotiating with local authorities. 
Although Scottish branches of UK organizations have some degree of representation, the EIS 
is by far the biggest. This reflects a long tradition of difference in Scottish education 
(Cairney, 2013a). In higher education, the University and College Union (Scottish Branch) 
has a Scottish focus, although the existence of UK-wide arrangements for research funding 
and the high mobility of staff necessitates a greater degree of integration with a UK body. 
Health policy is one of the most devolved areas and the British Medical Association 
(BMA) and Royal College of Nursing (RCN) had reasonably well-established Scottish 
organizations before devolution. However, while both enjoy a high degree of autonomy on 
Scottish matters they also complain about a lack of UK understanding of devolution and a 
lack of organizational devolution (which affects levels of staffing and finance for devolved 
offices). Both tend to focus on Scottish NHS delivery (including the terms and conditions of 
their staff). The Royal Colleges of Surgeons and Physicians also influence the Scottish NHS, 
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but as bodies interested in standards, clinical guidelines and delivery rather than as a union. A 
significant UK focus is maintained by the reservation of medical standards and training. 
While all of these groups have an interest in Europeanization following the effects of the 
Working Time Directive, lobbying would take place around the implementation. 
While social work policy is devolved, there are good reasons to keep a UK as well as 
Scottish focus. The British Association of Social Workers (UK arm in Scotland) tends to 
follow policy developments. If, for example, a mental health bill or social work review is 
being processed by the Scottish Government it will direct its focus there. If there is an asylum 
bill or UK consideration of adoption, it then refocuses its efforts. This contrasts to some 
degree with housing and homelessness policy. Housing is devolved (although there are 
reserved elements such as levels of housing benefit) and groups tend to direct their efforts 
toward the Scottish Government and Parliament (with no real contact with MPs or MEPs).  
The SCVO generally devotes its time to developments within Scotland, but cannot maintain a 
sole Scottish focus while issues such as charity law remain reserved.   
 
Box 8.5 Cigarettes and Alcohol 
When groups seek to influence government they are faced not only with the appearance of 
multi-level policy responsibilities, but also shifting attitudes of governments to those groups 
and the policies they promote. A key example of this shift can be found in Scottish 
Government policies on public health.  Two of the Scottish Government’s most high profile 
Acts have come in this area: the Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005 (to 
ban smoking in public places) and the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) Scotland Act 2012.  The 
smoking ban was a pivotal moment in Scottish tobacco control (and is sometimes described 
as the most important bill in Scottish Parliament history), but might also be regarded as the 
logical conclusion to 20-30 years of policy change, with public health and medical groups 
increasingly consulted at the expense of tobacco companies.  Indeed, tobacco companies are 
more willing than most organisations to employ firms to make legal challenges on initiatives 
(such as the Scottish Government plan to enforce plain packaging, with large health warnings 
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for cigarettes) if their ‘venue shopping’ at the Scottish, UK and EU levels proves 
unsuccessful (Cairney, 2007b; 2007d; 2008; 2009a; Asare et al, 2009; Cairney et al, 2012).   
Alcohol policy is different because consumption is more difficult to ‘de-normalise’ 
(people can consume alcohol socially in safe amounts) and alcohol companies are not as 
‘demonised’ as their tobacco equivalents (indeed, whisky manufacturers may still enjoy a 
very positive image). Consequently, governments often negotiate policies in partnership with 
both public health and alcohol industry bodies (including the major producers and, for 
example, the supermarkets that sell the products).  Holden and Hawkins (2012: 11) argue that 
the election of the SNP in 2007 marked a significant shift in group-government relations, 
undermining the partnership-with-industry approach of its predecessor government by 
pressing ahead with plans for a minimum unit price for alcohol.  The Scottish Government 
was still open for consultation, but based on the understanding that it had made a decision in 
this case.  Consequently, the industry campaigned to influence opposition MSPs (a crucial 
factor – the SNP was only able to pass the bill when it formed a majority government in 
2011), employed PR firms to oppose the measures in the media and explored the possibility 
of making a legal challenge in Scottish courts and/ or at the EU level (2012: 18-19). 
 
The impact of SNP Government since 2007 
Chapter 7 describes a major SNP effect on central-local relations, with the Scottish 
Government signing a concordat with COSLA that introduces greater autonomy for local 
authorities.  This move has enhanced an already distinctive ‘Scottish Policy Style’ relating to 
the ways in which it implements policy.  The Scottish Government often, and increasingly, 
adopts a ‘bottom up’ approach to implementation in which flexibility is built into the initial 
policy. In comparison with the dominant image of the UK Government’s implementation 
style, there is less of a sense of top-down control linked to specific targets which are 
monitored and enforced energetically (Greer and Jarman, 2008; Cairney, 2011a: 184).   
Implementing bodies are often given considerable discretion to manage implementation, 
based perhaps on a combination of ‘a high degree of trust in the professionalism of providers’ 
(Greer and Jarman, 2008: 178), the ability of Scottish policymakers to form direct, personal 
223 
relationships with the chief executives of health boards and local authorities, and the 
philosophies of particular governments.  The SNP Government, and Alex Salmond in 
particular, has signalled an end to ‘top-down diktats’ (Cairney, 2011a: 130). 
This move has benefited local authorities (often the biggest players in Scottish Government 
consultations) but is often criticised by other pressure participants.  It produces the counter-
intuitive finding that the same Scottish groups, who seem relatively satisfied with the 
consultation process (discussed above), often appear to be more disappointed with policy 
outcomes than their UK counterparts (even allowing for the fact that some pro-devolution 
campaigners had exaggerated hopes for major policy change).  Such dissatisfaction may be 
an unintended consequence of the combination of Scottish policy styles.  First, it adopts a 
consensual consultation style, promoting high group ownership of policy and signalling to 
groups that they can make a difference to government decisions.  Second, it pursues a 
bottom-up implementation style, in which it sets strategic priorities but often leaves the 
details of implementation to other organisations.   
Consequently, groups with limited resources may be the least supportive of flexible delivery 
arrangements because they often only have the ability to influence the initial policy choice 
made by the Scottish Government.  The more that governments make policy commitments 
that lack detailed restrictions, and leave the final outcome to the organisations that deliver 
policy, the less some groups see their initial influence continued during implementation 
(Cairney, 2009b: 366).   Even the better resourced groups, which once had to influence a 
single Scottish Government, may now have to lobby to influence 32 different local authorities 
with different aims.  The potential irony is that a combination of two different Scottish policy 
styles, both of which focus on consensus and trust, may contribute to rather tense group-
government relationships.  For example, teaching unions and local authorities often engage in 
relatively tense negotiations at the local level (Cairney, 2013a) and similar tensions may 
develop between local and health authorities.  The devolution of responsibility also makes 
allies of many groups and the Scottish Parliament which is often frustrated by its inability to 
hold the Scottish Government to account when it devolves so much responsibility to local and 
health authorities.   
Conclusion 
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Most policy is made by governments in consultation with pressure participants such as 
interest groups.  This chapter examines the extent to which that process, or pluralist 
democracy, is distinctive in Scotland.  This was certainly the aim of devolution reformers, 
with the SCC drawing (albeit rather broadly) on ideas that we might associate with Lijphart’s 
(1999) distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies.  It is also the picture 
identified by Flinders (2010), who identifies ‘bi-constitutionality’, or the development of a 
consensus democracy in Scotland at the same time as the Labour Government maintained 
majoritarianism in the UK.   
There is certainly extensive evidence to suggest that Scotland has its own system of group 
government relations, associated with Keating et al’s (2009) idea of ‘territorial policy 
communities’.  Scottish groups have refocused their efforts towards the Scottish arena and the 
different policy agendas pursued by the Scottish Government.  However, the evidence also 
points to a rather complicated picture of group-government relations, in which the ‘Scottish 
Policy Style’ may often be distinctive, but that difference may not necessarily be caused by a 
new culture of policymaking or new Scottish institutions.   
There is some evidence that the Scottish Government does not just consult with the 
‘usual suspects’. Further, most groups interviewed are satisfied with the consultation process, 
feel that decision-makers are accessible and that their opinions are listened to. However, the 
extent to which the Scottish process differs from the UK is debatable.  Further, the 
differences may relate most to particular circumstances in Scotland (for example, the Scottish 
Government has relatively limited policy capacity and relies more on outside groups for 
information and advice) and perhaps even a particular era (when public expenditure was high, 
reducing competition for policy resources).  
 It is also difficult to talk of a distinctive Scottish style when pressure participants often 
have to maintain a sophisticated lobbying strategy to ensure that they lobby the right people 
at the right level of government at the right time.  A key development in this multi-level 
picture is the new role of local authorities as the locus of power for many decisions which 
were once the purview of the Scottish Government.  Groups may increasingly find that a 
focus on a ‘Scottish Policy Style’ is misleading, since group-government relations may vary 
considerably within Scotland.   
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Further reading 
Keating (2005; 2010; Keating et al 2009) and Cairney (2008; 2009c; 2011a; 2011b; 2013a; 
Cairney and Jordan, 2013) have written extensively on ‘Territorial Policy Communities’ and 
the ‘Scottish Policy Style’.  See Cairney (2012a: chapter 8) and chapter 9 for further reading 
on multi-level governance. 
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